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Despite delays, Basel II remains set to be finalized this year with 
implementation in Basel Committee countries by the end of 2006. How 
will this agreement between a set of G10+ countries affect emerging 
economies?  Two implications are considered here for countries in Latin 
America.  First, earlier papers have suggested that implementation in G10+ 
may affect the cost of capital and may introduce pro-cyclicality. The 
analysis presented indicates that these concerns may be exaggerated 
depending on the value of critical parameters. Second, Latin America may 
choose to implement the new agreement locally. Five country 
characteristics are detailed that might serve as a guide to govern whether 
and if so how Basel II should be implemented.  Moreover, a simpler 
Centralized Rating Based (CRB) approach to enhance provisioning is 
proposed as an initial or transition step for the region. Finally, a number of 
largely unresolved, cross-border issues are discussed. 
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Basel II, the new Accord regarding bank capital to be finalized during 2004 
for implementation in Basel Committee Countries before the end of 2006, 
will affect all countries in two distinct ways
2.  First, to the extent that the 
new standards are binding on banks (or relax previously binding standards), 
they will affect the cost of capital and hence economic growth and welfare 
across the globe. Second, while no country is legally obliged to implement 
the Accord locally, more than 100 countries claim to have implemented 
Basel I and it is likely that many will consider implementing Basel II.  
Basel II introduces several alternatives and whether, and if so how, 
emerging countries should implement Basel II remains an open question.  
 
It is argued below that Latin America falls between two stools.  The so-
called Standardized Approach, that uses the ratings of private agencies, 
may give little in terms of linking capital to risk given the low degree of 
corporate rating penetration in the region. On the other hand the Internal 
Rating Based approach, that allows banks to develop their own rating 
scales and rating methodology, looks complex and difficult to monitor 
given the current pattern of Basel Core Principle for Effective Banking 
Supervision compliance. The proposal here is then for the use of a 
Centralized Rating Based (CRB) approach, perhaps to enhance 
provisioning, as a transitional step to IRB. 
 
Many emerging economies have foreign banks from Basel Committee 
countries operating in their jurisdictions. These are precisely the 
internationally active banks that will be implementing the more advanced 
approaches of Basel II on a worldwide, consolidated basis.  While cross-
border issues were already present under Basel I, Basel II will heighten 
them and many remain, as yet, unresolved. 
 
In this paper, I first try to give an idea of the effect of Basel II on the cost 
of capital for countries in Latin America – section 2.   In contrast to several 
previous papers the headline result is that Basel II may have no effect on 
the cost of capital for most emerging countries, except those with the 
lowest credit ratings. This result is however critically dependent on the 
mapping between credit ratings and default probabilities employed.  
Subject to the same qualification, no additional pro-cyclicality may be 
introduced.  Section 3 is devoted to whether and how emerging countries 
                                                             
2 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (1988) and (2003a) for the old and the proposed new 
Accord.  These, together with literally hundreds of comments are available on www.bis.org. 
 may wish to implement Basel II locally.  I introduce five country 
characteristics that might assist countries considering implementing the 
new agreement
3. Section 4 discusses the Centralized Rating Based idea.  
Section 5 discusses a set of important cross border issues still to be 
resolved and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Basel II: On the Cost of Capital for Emerging Countries 
 
A set of earlier papers considered the effect of Basel II on emerging 
countries’ cost of capital
4.  These papers all employed the following "cost 
and return" of funds equation.  This assumes that banks are risk neutral, 
that the market for lending to emerging country sovereigns is perfectly 
competitive and that banks make a specified required return on capital: 
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where r is the risk free (say Libor) interest rate, c is the cost of capital 
expressed as a spread, k1 is the current percentage of the loan financed by 
capital, s1 is the current lending spread, p is the probability that the loan 
will be defaulted on and l is the loss given default expressed as a 
percentage of the loan amount
5.  There is an implicit assumption that 
deposits are insured at no cost to the bank and hence depositors do not 
require a premium over the risk free rate. 
 
Consider what would happen to spreads if the portion of the loan financed 
by bank capital were to change. Suppose that k2 is the new portion of the 
loan financed by capital and s2 is the new spread, rewriting the same 
equation but replacing s1 by s2 and k1 by k2, and then subtracting equation 
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There are various ways to use this approach to estimate the effect of Basel 
II on spreads depending on which variables in equation (2) are taken as 
endogenous, and say calculated from market prices, and which are 
considered as exogenous. Previous work has assumed that Basel I and 
Basel II both bind, and hence that k1 and k2 are exogenous. This surely 
                                                             
3 Sections 3 and 4 draw on  
4 See Deutsche Bank (2001), Reisen (2001), Griffiths Jones (2001), Powell (2002) and Weder and 
Wedow (2002). 
5 See Repullo and Suarez (2004) for the formal derivation of such an equation may come from given a 
fully elaborated equilibrium loan-pricing model. overestimates the effect of Basel II on spreads. In this paper I take the 
initial capital, k1, as endogenous and calculate it from equation 1 using an 





r lp p s r
k
− − − +
=
) 1 )( ( 1
1      ( 3 )  
 
The rationale for endogenizing capital in this way is that, assuming a 
competitive market and risk neutrality, this “economic capital” would give 
the minimum leverage ratio that would make lending to that particular 
sovereign viable at the market spread. 
 
Suppose now Basel II implied an increase in required capital due to the 
new regulations. Then we can calculate, using equation 2, the required 
increase in the spread such that banks would be willing to lend to that 
sovereign. With endogenous “economic capital”, the following logical 
possibilities must be taken into account considering the effect of Basel II 
on spreads: 
 
A) Basel I and Basel II do not bind and hence Basel II has no effect. 
 
B) Basel I does not bind but Basel II does bind and hence Basel II will 
increase spreads. 
 
C) Basel I and Basel II both bind and hence Basel II has an effect on 
spreads - either to increase or decrease
6. 
 
D) Basel I binds but Basel II does not and hence Basel II will decrease 
spreads. 
 
The potential effect of Basel II is then calculated in the following steps: 
 
1.  A selection of countries in Latin America for which Emerging 
Market Bond Index (EMBI) spreads and (Standard & Poor’s) ratings 
are available is chosen
7. 
 
                                                             
6 It should be noted that if Basel I binds then this implies that Basel I banks should not find it 
economically viable to lend to that sovereign.  The calculated change in spread is then interpreted as the 
change in spread that would make it economically viable for Basel II regulated banks to lend to that 
sovereign and not necessarily the change in spread that would actually occur.   
7 We exclude Argentina that is classified as SD – selected default. 2.  The average sovereign EMBI bond spread over 2003 is taken for 
each country if that country had the same rating over the period. 
Otherwise, the EMBI spread is used for the period in 2003 for which 
the rating at the end of that year is appropriate
8. 
 
3.  “Economic capital” is then calculated using a default probability 
consistent with the country rating.  The mapping from credit rating to 
default probability employed is a 12-month Standard and Poor’s 
mapping. An LGD of 45% is employed (as that assumed in Basel 
II’s Foundation IRB approach), a risk rate of 4% and a required rate 
of return of 18%
9. 
 
4.  The calculated “economic capital” is then compared to Basel I and 
Basel II (Standardized and IRB) capital requirements to consider 
which alternative A) to D) listed above is relevant. 
a.  Basel II’s standardized approach is calculated using the 
relevant capital charge for the sovereign given the rating and 
Basel’s Consultative Paper Number 3, paragraph 27 (page 7). 
b.  Using the same mapping as in step 3, the Basel II Foundation 
IRB required capital ratio is calculated using the curve as 
stated in the Basel Consultative Paper Number 3, paragraph 
241 (page 50). 
 
5.  If relevant, the effect on the spread is then calculated using Equation 
(2) above and using the relevant endogenous capital as k1 and the 







                                                             
8 The results are not very sensitive to the value of the risk free rate - see discussion below. 
9 The sensitivity of the results to these assumptions is discussed below. 
10 In the case of Chile we find Basel I binds but not Basel II so k1 is Basel I’s 8% and k2 is the endogenous 
capital. 
Table 1: Effect of Basel II on Bank Capital and Spreads
            (Using 1 Year S&P Default Probabilities)
  Capital Requirements Implied Spread Changes 
Default Average Endogenous Basel II Basel II Basel II Basel II
Country Rating Probability Spread Capital Standardized IRB Standardized IRB
Chile A- 0.05% 1.00% 8.0% 4.0% 1.6% -0.2% -0.2%
Mexico BBB 0.22% 2.43% 16.6% 4.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Colombia BB 0.94% 5.09% 32.7% 8.0% 7.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Panama BB 0.94% 3.73% 23.1% 8.0% 7.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Peru BB- 1.33% 4.27% 25.4% 8.0% 8.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Brazil B+ 2.91% 8.33% 47.6% 8.0% 11.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Venezuela B- 10.32% 7.19% 10.0% 8.0% 20.3% 0.0% 2.1%
Ecuador CCC+ 21.32% 11.84% 8.0% 12.0% 29.0% 0.9% 4.8% 
 
 
The results are presented in Table 1 for a selection of countries in Latin 
America.  The bottom line is that in most cases neither Basel I nor Basel II 
bind and hence Basel II will have no effects
11!  Only for the two countries 
in the sample with the lowest credit rating (Venezuela and Ecuador) will 
the Basel II, IRB approach result in higher spreads.  In the case of 
Venezuela Basel I is found not to bind but Basel II IRB does bind and for 
Ecuador both Basel I and Basel II bind.  It may seem counter-intuitive that 
Basel I only binds for these high risk countries.  But the rationale is that in 
the cases of countries with higher ratings (Mexico and Colombia etc), the 
spreads are high relative to the assumed default probabilities.  Hence it is 
“economic” in these cases to lend with lower leverage – with more capital. 
The effect of Basel II would be an increase in spreads of 210 and 480 basis 
points, if Venezuela and Ecuador respectively wished to borrow from Basel 
II regulated banks.  The case of Chile is also of interest.  Here, for the 
parameters employed, Basel I binds but Basel II will not bind and so 
spreads will be reduced – by some 20 basis points
12. 
 
Comparing these results to previous results in the literature, Reisen (2001) 
and Griffith-Jones (2001) both suggest that that the effects of Basel II will 
be significantly larger. These authors assume Basel I and Basel II both bind 
(k1 and k2 exogenous) and use equation (1) to solve for an endogenous cost 
of capital, c. This results in very high estimates of c and (hence) very 
significant effects for Basel II IRB through equation (2). Powell (2002) 
also assumes Basel I and Basel II both bind but also that the cost of capital 
is exogenous. This reduces the effect of Basel II although the effects are 
still quite significant especially for the IRB approach. However, there is a 
potential inconsistency between the assumed cost of capital and the market 
spread. Weder and Wedow (2002) updates the Powell (2002) estimates for 
the new “flatter” IRB curves and consequently finds the effect of Basel II 
to be somewhat reduced. Moreover, these authors also conduct an 
empirical analysis that leads them to conclude that Basel I may not bind 
when it comes to lending to emerging country sovereigns backing up the 
approach taken here. 
 
However, the results presented are naturally dependent on the various 
assumptions employed.  However, the results are not particularly sensitive 
                                                             
11 As Weder and Wedow (2002) remark, this appears to be consistent with the views of some “insiders” 
of the Basel II process and discussion. 
12 The EMBI spread for Chile is the EMBI global spread which trended down over 2003 ending the year 
at less than the 1% spread level used here.  For a spread of 1.15% given Chile’s A- rating and the S&P 12 
month default probabilities the endogenous capital is exactly equal to Basel I’s 8%. to the assumption on the required rate of return on capital or on the riskless 
rate.  Reducing the required return to 15% implies smaller increases in 
spreads given IRB for Venezuela (to 1.3%) and Ecuador (4%) and that 
Basel I no longer binds for Chile and so eradicating Chile’s 30 basis point 
gain.  For all other countries there is, as before, no effect.  Increasing the 
required rate of return on capital to 21% increases the effect of IRB for 
Venezuela and Ecuador (to 2.8% and 5.6% respectively) and Chile’s gain 
rises to 30 basis points.  Again, there is no effect for the other countries.  
Altering the riskless rate in the region of 2% to 6% makes virtually no 
difference to the results – this range implies an effect of IRB on Venezuela 
of 2.07% to 2.09%. 
 
Varying the loss given default in a reasonable range also does not affect the 
headline result – that for most countries Basel I nor Basel II will bind.  Nor 
does it make any difference to Ecuador where both bind. For Venezuela 
where Basel I does not bind, this variable does matter and in quite non-
linear fashion
13. If the loss given default could be reduced to 35% then the 
effect of IRB is reduced from 210 to 60 basis points.  If it is increased to 
55% then the effect of IRB is increased to 2.5%.  This implies that there 
may be significant gains to attempting to reduce the loss given default 
using credit risk mitigation techniques under IRB. 
 
However, the results are quite sensitive to the assumed default probability 
mappings.  Weder and Wedow (2002) present an interesting comparison of 
12 month S&P, 12 month Moody’s and 3 year S&P default probabilities
14.  
These are all based on corporate default histories and hence there is 
uncertainty as to whether they are truly appropriate for considering 
sovereign risk. The problem is that the information on sovereign default is 
(fortuitously) very limited.  However, Hu et al (2001) discusses the 
estimation of a rating transition probability matrix for sovereigns 
notwithstanding the limited data using a mixture of naïve rating transition 
experience, a probit model and a Bayesian system to update priors to 
ensure a smooth result. 
 
The implied 12-month default probabilities from Hu et al (2001) are quite 
different to the 12 month S&P corporate default probabilities employed 
above and give much higher default probabilities especially for lower 
ratings. They are closer to the 3-year S&P estimates. Table 2 shows the 
results if the Hu et al (2001) default probabilities are employed.  Now we 
                                                             
13 It also matters for Chile where Basel II does not bind but the changes are quantitatively very small. 
14 See also Moody’s Investor Services (1999) and (2000) and Standard and Poor’s (2000) and (2002).  
Powell (2002) uses the mapping quoted in Jackson (2001) which gives results similar to the 12 month 
default probabilities.  find that Basel I and Basel II both bind for Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and 
Ecuador and we find required changes in spreads of 150, 550, 880 and 





Table 2 also lists the default probabilities and they do appear to get very 
high for the lower rated credits.  Brazil for example, as a B+ risk, has a 
25% default probability. To date, the very limited information that is 
available regarding low rated sovereigns and the scarce default experience 
implies that these estimates should probably be used with extreme caution.  
To give a better idea of the overall sensitivity of the results to the 
assumptions on this critical parameter, Table 3 presents some further 
results for different sovereign spreads and different assumed default 
probabilities.  This table is created with Brazil in mind which had an 
average sovereign spread of 8.3% and standard deviation 2.6% over 2003 
and the 12 month S&P and Hu et al default probabilities are 2.91% and 
24.7% respectively.  The 12-month Moody (corporate estimated) default 
probability is 3.4%. 
 
At the bottom left of the Table, with higher spreads and lower default 
probabilities, Basel I and Basel II do not bind.  At the top right, both Basel 
Table 1: Effect of Basel II on Bank Capital and Spreads
     (Using Perraudin et al Adjusted Default Probabilities)
  Capital Requirements Implied Spread Changes 
Default Average Endogenous Basel II Basel II Basel II Basel II
Country Rating Probability Spread Capital Standardized IRB Standardized IRB
Chile A- 0.0% 1.00% 17.4% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Mexico BBB 0.0% 2.43% 17.4% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Colombia BB 2.5% 5.09% 26.7% 8.0% 10.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Panama BB 2.5% 3.73% 17.3% 8.0% 10.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Peru BB- 6.4% 4.27% 8.0% 8.0% 16.0% 0.0% 1.5%
Brazil B+ 24.7% 8.33% 8.0% 8.0% 31.0% 0.0% 5.5%
Venezuela B- 39.8% 7.19% 8.0% 8.0% 37.4% 0.0% 8.8%
Ecuador CCC+ 69.3% 11.84% 8.0% 12.0% 43.6% 2.3% 20.9%
         Table 3:  Sensitivity Analysis Effect of Basel II IRB
Default Probability
2.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0%
2.0% 0.38% 1.19% 2.40% 3.51% 4.54% 5.6%
4.0% 0.00% 0.88% 2.40% 3.51% 4.54% 5.6%
6.0% 0.00% 0.00% 2.40% 3.51% 4.54% 5.6%
Spread 8.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.72% 3.51% 4.54% 5.6%
10.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.47% 4.54% 5.6%
12.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 4.54% 5.6%
14.0% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.09% 5.6%I and Basel II bind and then only the assumed default probability is 
important in determining the effect of Basel II - as that is used in the IRB 
capital requirement calculation
15. Along the diagonal, Basel I does not bind 
but Basel II does bind, and then both the spread and the default probability 
are important in determining the effect of Basel II; as the spread determines 
the initial endogenous “economic capital”. 
 
As can be seen from the Table, while the base case for Brazil (a spread of 
8.33% and a default probability of 2.91%) gives no effect of Basel II, a 
spread of 8% and a perceived default probability of 10% yields a 72 basis 
point effect and higher assumed default probabilities give higher effects up 
to the 560 basis point effect using the Hu et al probabilities.  The 12-month 
corporate S&P default probabilities are probably too low whereas the Hu et 
al default probabilities look very high.  The effect of Basel II for spreads 
from 6% to 12% and default probabilities 2% to 10%, ranges from zero to 




On Pro-Cyclicality and Circularity 
 
There has been much discussion regarding Basel II and pro-cyclicality.  
The above methodology can also shed some light on this issue. In the 
previous section we considered the rating and the spread of a country as a 
constant. In practice ratings and spreads change over time. Economic 
capital will then also change over time.  The appropriate question is not 
then whether Basel II introduces pro-cyclicality but whether it increases it. 
 
To shed light on this, using the same methodology we can consider what 
would have happened to the Argentine spread leading up to the Argentine 
crisis in 2001. In other words we calculate for each month on the basis of 
Argentina’s spread and rating (and 12 month S&P default probabilities) at 
that time, the “economic capital”, and test whether Basel II IRB would 
have been binding and implied an increase in capital. To cut to the 
conclusion, we find that neither Basel I nor Basel II IRB bind for the whole 
of 2001, so that Basel II implementation would have had no effect on 
required spreads for IRB banks to lend leading up to the Argentine crisis. 
                                                             
15 As discussed previously, in this part of the table as Basel I binds banks may not find it profitable to 
lend at the current spread.  The change in the spread should then be interpreted as the change required 
such that, under Basel II, banks would be willing to lend. 
16 Basel II also affects the cost of capital to private banks and non-financial corporations in emerging 
countries.  Depending on the structure of bank lending, these effects may be more important in terms of a 
country’s cost of capital than lending to the sovereign.  
However, once again if we take the Hu et al (2001) default probabilities we 
get very different results.  Figure 1 plots the results in that case.  In 
January, February and March 2001, spreads would have been unchanged.  
However, as Argentina was downgraded in April 2001 from BB- to B+, 
according to the Hu et al (2001) the default probability would have risen 
from 6.4% to 24.7% and while actual spreads rose to almost 10% they 
would have had to rise to 15% in order for Basel II IRB regulated banks to 
have continued lending. The difference between actual and simulated 
spreads (to ensure IRB banks would have lent) rises from about 5% to 9% 
as Argentina is downgraded again in June 2001. And this difference rises to 
almost 20% in October of the same year.  Again, however, the Hu et al 
(2001) estimated default probability mappings should be viewed with 
caution.  In particular the jump from 6.4% to 24.7% default probability on 
the downgrade from BB- to B+ appears considerable. 
 
Perhaps of more concern than potential pro-cyclicality of Basel II is 
potential circularity. Argentina’s ratings reflected perceptions of 
Argentina’s access to international markets to roll over its debts.  But 
access to international capital markets is also, to some extent determined, 
by a country’s rating. The point is not that Argentina’s problems were 
purely of a liquidity nature.  However, the use of ratings may well 
introduce some measure of circularity. If the circularity is serious enough 
this might just spell the difference between being able to roll-over and 
buying time to adjust and a very costly default. 
 
Although the quantitative effects are smaller, this is a real danger for the 
Standardized Approach.  Given that there are so few international ratings 
agencies, the change in rating of one agency that moved a country from one 
Figure 1: Argentina: Simulated Spreads under Basel II
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Actual Spread Simulated Spreadbucket to another, may have significant effects. Moreover, by the same 
token, there may also be a significant cost to one simply getting it wrong. 
The introduction of the ratings by export credit guarantee agencies and 
their publication is to be welcomed in this regard
17.  The more opinions 
there are, the better from this point of view. 
 
An alternative would be to introduce a simplified IRB approach for 
sovereign credits whereby banks would simply be asked to use their own 
ratings but according to a standardized scale.  An international body (as the 
OECD is doing for the export credit agency ratings, an obvious candidate 
being the BIS) could collect those ratings across Basel Committee 
countries and publicize the median ratings for countries and other statistics. 
This would increase the number of “opinions” still further and possibly 
lessen the concern, whether correct or not, that, official, export credit 
agency ratings may suffer from political pressures. 
 
In this paper, and following much of the literature, I only consider changes 
in the cost of capital for international lending to Latin American 
sovereigns
18. In practice, international banks lend more to banks and non-
financial corporates than to sovereigns. The BIS consolidated banking 
statistics indicate that as of end Sept 2003, there were US$45.3bn in 
outstanding international claims on sovereigns in Latin America, 
US$37.8bn on banks and US$137bn on non financial corporates. Clearly 
the change in the overall “cost of capital” to the region will depend on the 
change in required capital for international lending to the private sector as 
well as to sovereigns. The above estimates should not be thought of as an 
estimate of the overall cost implications of Basel II - as such it may be a 
gross underestimate. 
 
However, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the change in 
the cost of capital for the private sector related to the cross border issues of 
Basel II as discussed below. The BIS statistics quoted are based on 
“international claims” defined as “cross-border” claims in any currency 
plus local claims in foreign currency. Total “international claims” as of 
September 2003 amount to US$223bn but then there are a reported 
US$245bn of “local claims” defined as claims of BIS consolidated 
reporting entities in local currency in the host country. Unfortunately, the 
sectoral breakdown between sovereign, bank and non-bank is only 
available for the international claims and not for the local claims.  In the 
case of an international claim on a sovereign with a credit rating, it is 
                                                             
17 These ratings are to be published on the OECD website, www.oecd.org 
18 Powell (2002) does attempt to estimate costs to banks and non banks private corporates but the 
methodology adopted is almost surely also an underestimate. difficult to imagine that the home regulator would allow a different 
treatment of the risk in the consolidated global entity whether the claim be 
in the head office or, say, in a local subsidiary. However, in the case of 
claims on the private sector in local or possibility even in foreign currency 
this is still not clear. As discussed further below, a likely scenario is for the 
international bank to adopt IRB but the local subsidiary may not. These 
problems of implementation hamper a clean assessment of the important 
issue of potential changes in the cost of capital for the private sector. The 
overall change in the “cost of capital” for a country may be quite different 
to the calculations presented depending on a) the structure of lending to the 
country (sovereign, bank or non bank and cross border or local) b) if and 
how Basel II is implemented locally and how cross-border issues are 
resolved and c) the credit ratings (external or internal) of the relevant 
private sector entities. 
 
To conclude this section, if standard (corporate) default probability 
mappings are used, Basel II will have little effect on Latin American 
economies but will only affect the cost of capital in the case of the 
countries with poorer ratings such as Venezuela and Ecuador. However, if 
recent estimated default probabilities for sovereigns are employed we get 
very different results and potentially quite significant effects. While the 
S&P default probabilities may be too low, the latter look very high and are 
estimated on sparse sovereign default histories and should be treated with 
caution. A more realistic sensitivity analysis gives either no effect for Basel 
II or an effect of up to a maximum 240 basis points (roughly one standard 
deviation of the EMBI spread) for Brazil, a B+ risk. 
 
3 Implementing Basel II in Emerging Countries 
 
The Basel Committee has acknowledged that developing countries will 
likely need more time to implement Basel II than the 2006 deadline.  
Moreover, recent statements by the IMF and the World Bank have 
suggested that, in terms of the on-going Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP), Basel II implementation will not be considered as a 
requisite
19. Basel II itself includes various alternatives.  In terms of 
underlying credit risk evaluation in Pillar 1 these include (i) the 
Standardized Simplified Approach, (ii) the Simplified Approach, (iii) the 
Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach and (iv) the Advanced Internal 
Rating Based Approach.  There are then also different choices regarding (a) 
credit risk mitigation techniques, (b) securitization risk and (c) operations 
                                                             
19 One view however is that many developing country supervisors will not wish to be considered as 
lagging behind this new “standard” and some country authorities may be concerned that the market may 
punish them for non-implementation even if the IFI’s do not. risk. Table 4 provides a brief details. Countries will then have to decide 
whether they stay on Basel I or, if they do move to Basel II, which of the 








I suggest here that five country characteristics may aid in this decision.  I 
explain below the particular relevance of these characteristics
20: 
 
(i)  The degree of Basel Core Principles, and hence Basel II Pillar 
2, compliance. 
(ii)  The penetration of rating agencies and the operation of the 
rating market in general 
(iii)  The current level of bank capital and the feasibility of 
increases in bank capital ratios in the shorter term 
(iv)  The size of, or the strength of the desire to develop domestic 
capital markets. 
(v)  The availability of information and the degree of 
sophistication of banks and/or the supervisor in assessing and 
monitoring loan-loss provisioning. 
 
The data on the IMF and World Bank completed FSAP’s illustrate that 
many countries (including G10 but especially developing) are far from 
                                                             
20 See also the discussion in Powell (2003). 
Basic Credit Risk Credit Risk Mitigation Securitization Risks Operational Risk
The Approaches Measurement Technique
Simplified Standardized Export Credit Agencies Simple: risk weight of SSA banks can only invest Basic Indicator:
(www.oecd.org, Trade collateral subsitutes that of (cannot offer Capital=15% Gross Income
Directorate, ECA page) claim. enhancements or liquidity
facilities). Riskweight=100%
Standardized Approach Export Credit Agencies Simple: (as above). Standardized: uses export Basic Indicator. Or
or Credit Rating Agencies Comprehensive: exposure credit agency ratings Standardized Approach where
(eg: S&P, Moody's, Fitch) amount reduced subject to (only investing banks can Bank Capital = weighted sum
claim and collateral haircuts. use below BB+) of gross income across activities
IRB Foundation Banks' internal ratings Comprehensive, then IRB Approach: Investing More sophisitcated banks will be
for default probability LGD adjusted given banks may use bank expected to graduate to the
and Basel II formula reduction in exposure and Ratings according to a Advanced Measurement Approach
sets capital requirement capital requirement given standard scale. Originators where capital requirement given by
(Loss Given Default 45% by Basel formula may use Supervisory own risk measurement system.
for Senior and 75% Subord). Formula
IRB Advanced Banks set internal rating Own model determines LGD As IRB Foundation As IRB Foundation
(default probability), LGD and EAD and capital
Exposure At Default and requirement given by forumula
Maturity. Capital requirement
still given by Basel formula.being fully compliant with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision and, on average, developing countries lag their G10 
counterparts
21.  Of particular concern is the lack of (i) effective 
consolidated supervision, (ii) supervisory independence, resources and 
authority and (iii) effective prompt corrective action.  If supervisors lack 
resources and the basics of effective bank supervision, correcting this 
should be the first priority and more complex rules on capital requirements 
(Basel II Pillar 1) may well be counter productive.  Basel II also introduces 
a significant change to the level of consolidation required for banking 
supervision – from the bank itself to its holding company.  As many 
countries do not comply with more modest versions of consolidated 
supervision; these countries remain far from the spirit of the Basel II 
proposals. 
 
However, full BCP compliance is too strict a precondition for moving to 
Basel II – after all many G10 countries are not Compliant with all the 
BCPs.  In general a country should be BCP compliant to the degree 
required to implement the appropriate alternative chosen within the Basel II 
framework.  As an example, if a supervisor does not have the resources 
(including data, information, technical competence, staffing and 
management) to consider whether the calibration of the Basel II Internal 
Rating Based Approach (IRB) is appropriate to that country, or to monitor 
effectively how banks would apply the IRB methodology, then a simpler 
alternative should most certainly be adopted. 
 
Many developing countries will probably opt for the simpler Basel II 
approaches including the Simplified Standardized Approach (SSA) or 
possibly the Standardized Approach (SA).  An important difference 
between the two is that the latter allows for the use of credit ratings from 
private agencies whereas the former only uses the ratings of official export 
credit guarantee agencies – that only cover sovereigns.  However, the 
problem for many developing countries is that markets for credit ratings are 
shallow and hence the SSA nor the SA allows for much in terms of 
aligning capital requirements with risk. 
 
Of course, adopting the SA may create incentives for such ratings’ markets 
to develop but this brings its own dangers in terms of companies buying a 
good rating, provoking a “race to the bottom” in rating quality.  A similar 
argument might be made for some G10 regional or smaller banks - and this 
might lie behind the recent decision of the US to keep many of its banks on 
Basel I.  However, such banks are not likely to be “systemic” in a G10 
                                                             
21 See World Bank (2002) country.  The situation in some developing countries is different – large 
parts of systemic banks’ portfolios are largely unrated. 
 
The second characteristic is then the state of the ratings market.  For a 
country with no ratings market to speak of, the SA makes little sense.  Such 
a country should stick with Basel I or adopt the SSA or, if it has reasonably 
high compliance with the BCP’s, consider the Centralized Rating Based 
(CRB) approach discussed below as a potential precursor to Basel II’s IRB.  
For a country with an active ratings market, the SA makes more sense.  
 
Note that for a country adopting the SSA, or a country with a shallow 
market for ratings adopting the SA, Basel II will likely imply a sharp 
increase in bank capital requirements.  This will especially be the case if 
the risk weight on mortgages is not dropped to 35% and no extra benefit is 
given to retail exposures and tighter rules are employed on lending to the 
sovereign. The source of the extra capital charge is for operational risk.  
For a country adopting IRB or the SA with a deep ratings’ market the add-
on for operational risk may be offset by lower capital charges for higher 
rated claims.  However, for a developing country adopting SA or SSA this 
is unlikely to be the case.  An increase in capital requirements may be no 
bad thing but a developing country considering adopting Basel II should 
consider carefully the current level of bank capital and the feasibility of 
increasing bank capital.  This is then the third characteristic listed above. 
 
Basel II also includes significant enhancements for the credit risk 
implications of securitization risk and for credit risk mitigation techniques. 
A country with a fairly inactive ratings market may still benefit from the 
use of ratings in these areas. For example, if a country has an active market 
for securitized claims (growing in importance in some countries currently), 
then those claims will most likely be rated and hence the Basel II 
standardized approach regarding securitization risk might be gainfully 
adopted.  This may not seem to be too critical a feature.  However, if a 
country wishes to develop capital markets, then ensuring banks have the 
right incentives to securitize claims is important. Basel II does a much 
better job here than Basel I. 
 
A similar argument can be made for credit risk mitigation techniques.  
Here, Basel II makes significant enhancements and hence if markets using 
securities as collateral are important – or a country wishes to develop them 
– moving to Basel II may be appropriate.  The fourth characteristic listed is 
then the importance of local capital markets and the strength of the desire 
to develop them. 
 The final characteristic suggested is the sophistication of the supervisor and 
banks in terms of provisioning rules, monitoring and control. The spirit of 
Basel II is to replace a set of ad hoc rules regarding capital requirements 
with a more robust estimate of credit risk reflecting Value at Risk. Value at 
Risk may be decomposed into Expected Loss and Unexpected Loss subject 
to a statistical tolerance value. Current theory has it that provisions should 
reflect Expected Loss whereas capital should reflect Unexpected Loss.  For 
an Economist the appropriate level of provisioning and capital for credit 
risk then both come from the same probability distribution – they simply 
reflect different statistics of that same distribution. 
 
Considering this more general approach, a supervisor that has advanced in 
terms of more forward looking provisioning rules has also advanced in 
terms of considering finer risk-based capital rules. In several countries in 
the region, supervisors have set up centralized databases to monitor the 
large debtors of the financial system and ensure that each lender knows the 
total debt outstanding of larger borrowers, and in some cases these 
databases have been expanded to cover most loans of the financial system 
and are used to monitor and control provisioning requirements.  Miller 
(2003) presents a review of the design and the uses of these databases.  
While in most countries, such requirements are not forward looking but 
reflect arrears, if such a database is in place, the move to a more forward 
looking system for provisioning and capital is certainly made more 
feasible. For example, some countries have now incorporated a bank rating 
into these databases where that rating includes not only backward looking 
variables but also cash-flow type analyses. 
 
The final characteristic is then the sophistication of the supervisor and 
banks in terms of information on provisioning and loan-losses. A 
supervisor that has regularly tracked loan-losses across banks and has 
developed monitoring tools such as transition probability matrices and 
simple credit scoring techniques to monitor provisioning rules is in a much 
better position to implement Basel II’s IRB approach or the simpler 
Centralized Rating Based approach discussed below. Still, it is likely that 
the IRB or CRB will be appropriate only for the larger and more 
sophisticated banks. Indeed, for a country with a highly concentrated 
banking sector where a few large and more sophisticated banks control a 
large percentage of the sector, there are added benefits in moving to IRB or 
CRB at least for those banks.  
 
In conclusion, the above 5 characteristics may provide some navigational 
aid for countries regarding the Basel standards. Countries that do not 
comply with many of the basic Basel Core Principles are probably advised to stay with Basel I. However, if there is a wish to increase bank capital 
requirements then Basel II’s Simplified Standardized Approach should be 
considered if the extra burden of supervising operational risk is feasible. 
Countries that have only a very shallow market for ratings will get very 
limited benefits from the Standardized Approach and should be advised 
that this will also lead to an increase in capital requirements. They should 
either stick with the Simplified Standardized Approach, or if they have 
developed sufficient supervisory capacity, consider Basel II’s IRB or the 
CRB discussed below. However, countries that have deeper capital markets 
or the strong desire to develop them should reconsider the Standardized 
Approach for the enhancements to securitization risk and credit risk 
mitigation techniques. Finally, countries that have made advances in terms 
of forward looking provisioning rules and have the information and 
systems to control banks’ provisioning practices are better placed to 
consider IRB or the simpler CRB approach detailed below. 
 
4. A Centralized Rating Based Approach as a Transition to IRB
22 
 
To a large extent, Latin America lies between two stools when it comes to 
Basel II. On the one hand, most countries in the region have shallow 
markets for ratings such that the Standardized Approach yields little in 
terms of linking banks’ capital with risk. On the other hand, the drawbacks 
of Basel I (repeated in the Simplified Standardized Approach) are well 
known, there is a desire to link capital more with risk, but many supervisors 
may feel that they are some way away from being able to implement and 
monitor effectively the IRB approach that gives greater autonomy to 
regulated institutions. 
 
Due to these considerations, perhaps as a transitional tool, a methodology 
might be considered where the supervisor dictates a rating scale and asks 
banks to rate borrowers according to that centralized scale.  Each rating 
would then correspond to a probability of default and, combined with other 
loan information, that rating would imply a capital charge. This system 
would have the drawback that each bank would be forced to use the same 
scale that may not then be the particular scale most appropriate to the 
borrowers of that bank. For example a bank specialized in a particular type 
of lending or a particular sector would not necessarily wish to use the same 
scale as a more general bank or one specialized in another business.  The 
rating scale could be devised to be appropriate for the larger institutions so 
for countries with a more concentrated banking sector the costs would be 
minimized
23. 
                                                             
22 See also the discussion in Powell (2002) and Powell (2003). 
23 A slightly more complex version could have a different centralized rating scale for different portfolios.  
However, the great benefit of the approach is that the supervisor would be 
able to monitor and control banks’ ratings and hence monitor and control 
their capital sufficiency in relation to risk much more effectively.  In 
particular, the supervisor could very easily monitor banks’ average ratings, 
banks’ ratings for the same borrower, banks’ ratings for the same type of 
borrower, banks’ ratings for the same type of loan, banks’ ratings in the 
same economic region etc. These kinds of comparisons combined with 
simple procedures for spotting outliers and keeping a track of the different 
banks’ ratings of the main borrowers from the financial system are 
extremely valuable tools for a bank regulator. Naturally, for countries that 
had already developed a bank rating for the purposes of provisioning, this 
proposal would build very neatly indeed on those systems.  
 
This methodology could not truly be called the IRB approach as “internal” 
in IRB is normally thought of as referring to the scale and not just the 
rating. However, the same type of minimum criteria as discussed in Basel 
II’s IRB could be thought of as the minimum criteria for this system – for 
example in terms of the number of rating buckets and the history of 
information. Moreover, Basel II’s IRB curve could be used to calculate the 
capital charge based on the centralized ratings and a mapping of those 
ratings to default probabilities. The centralization of the rating scale 
provides another advantage here as the mapping and the calibration of the 
curve could be then easily be checked on a bank by bank and on a system 
wide basis by the supervisor using actual loan data. 
 
Furthermore, there is a simple way for a country to adopt a CRB approach 
and be fully compliant with Basel II at the same time. In particular, a 
country could adopt the Standardized Approach (SA) but still employ the 
CRB approach to calculate the total Value at Risk (after all, Basel II’s IRB 
approach is currently calibrated to cover the whole Value at Risk). Then the 
difference between the total CRB calculated Value at Risk and the capital 
charge given by the Standardized Approach could be used as an estimate of 
the forward-looking provisioning requirement appropriate on that loan.  
Under the revisions to the Basel II proposals currently underway, it is 
understood this would then allow a country to be fully Basel II compliant 
and link banks’ reserving policies closely to risk using the simpler CRB 
approach. 
 
Finally the CRB approach could be used as a precursor to IRB.  Once the 
CRB approach was working the supervisor could then work with banks to 
approve their own rating scales and rating methodology using the basic 








5 On Cross Border Issues 
 
As banking has become globalized and not just internationalized, cross-
border regulatory and supervisory issues have grown
24.  While Basel II 
does not change the basic premises on which cross-border banking 
regulation has developed, it does create a set of interesting issues as noted 
in the recent “High Level Principles” – Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (2003b). This note makes clear that local host regulators may 
apply a different regulatory standard than home supervisors and banks, as 
they do today, may well be asked to satisfy the local regulations at the level 




As some countries will remain with Basel I, and Basel II contains several 
different alternatives, dual regulatory treatment is then likely to remain the 
normal state of affairs. And as an international bank may operate in many 
different locations, the organization may have to comply with multiple 
regulatory regimes. On the other hand, there is clearly an argument that 
calls for greater homogeneity of regulatory treatment and reduction in 
regulatory costs both for supervisors and for banks. In practice this is then 
likely to be something of a balancing act for home and host supervisors. 
 
The issue for a host regulator is that the risk of the subsidiary is not 
necessarily the same as the risk of the international bank. The risks might 
be treated the same if the international bank gave a comprehensive and 
transparent guarantee to the subsidiary, but this is not normally the case. If 
there is no transparent and comprehensive guarantee and if the subsidiary is 
large for the host country then it is more likely that the local regulator will 
                                                             
24 The BIS and others refer to internationalization as cross-border lending and globalization as banks 
setting up brick and mortar operations in multiple countries.  There has been a marked increase in 
globalization in the 1990’s. 
25 We do not dwell here on the differences between subsidiaries and branches but simply note that some 
developing countries allow one form or the other or both and some ask branches to have capital in the 
host country.  This choice may depend largely on local bankruptcy legislation although this is an area 
where there appears to remain some legal uncertainties.  See del Negro and Kay (2002) for an interesting 
discussion of the position of US banks in Argentina. insist on rules that (i) ensure adequate protection to the local financial 
system and (ii) that the local regulator can understand, monitor and enforce. 
 
However, at the same time an over-riding objective of Basel II should be to 
use the cross-border supervisory issues as a springboard for supervisory 
cooperation and where possible for knowledge transfer in order to enhance 
BCP compliance across the globe.  Indeed greater cooperation and 
knowledge transfer is likely to lead to faster regulatory homogeneity. One 
simple idea is that whenever an on-site inspection is made of an 
international bank in a developing country, then the host supervisor should 
have the option to send its own staff to accompany that inspection.  
However, there are surely other modes of cooperation that can be 
developed and formalized to enhance knowledge transfer. 
 
Many of the international banks operating in Latin America are the banks 
that are likely to be adopting the IRB approach on a global consolidated 
basis. Perhaps then of most interest is the case where the international bank 
adopts IRB and the local subsidiary, due to local regulations, must apply 
either Basel I or Basel II’s Standardized Approach (SA). 
 
In the interests of regulatory efficiency, and especially if the subsidiary is 
not too large compared to the international bank, there must be a good case 
for the home supervisor also to simply allow the international bank to use 
the SA – at the very least for local claims in local currency – to calculate 
the capital charge. Although this would raise some issues of consolidation 
and arbitrage, this might reduce regulatory costs without too much loss in 
terms of linking capital to risk
26. 
 
In some cases, and particularly for the more sophisticated emerging 
economies, the host may allow an IRB approach for the subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the regulatory 
treatment will be the same in the home and in the host country. Indeed it 
seems unlikely that the IRB curve is calibrated correctly for Latin 
American risks
27.  And several of the supervisory parameters for the 
Foundation Approach may need to be reconsidered – such as Loss Given 
Default and Exposure at Default 
 
In the interests of regulatory efficiency, again the home supervisor might 
use the regulatory capital estimate of the host supervisor in calculating the 
                                                             
26 An important aspect of the use of the SA is the question of which ratings should be used?  Local 
regulators will no doubt employ the local currency ratings for domestic corporations.  In this proposal the 
home supervisor should also accept these ratings, especially for local currency instruments. 
27 See Balzarotti, Castro and Powell (2003) for the case of Argentina. total capital charge of the bank. Pillar 3 uses the concept of materiality to 
suggest what disclosures a bank should make regarding capital, and capital 
requirements, by subsidiary and by type of risk.  If the home supervisor 
allows the bank to use the local regulations towards its home capital 
requirement then under Pillar 3, and the local regulators’ rules, the bank 
would have to disclose the requirement and its actual level of capital. 
 
However, in the case where the home supervisor does not allow the bank to 
use its local capital requirement for the purposes of the home supervisor, 
then the bank should certainly be asked to reveal the capital requirement of 
the subsidiary and the capital according to the rules of the home supervisor.  
In other words if a subsidiary in a developing country is large enough for a 
home country supervisor to insist that it adopt the same IRB procedure as 
the international bank, it should surely be considered as material under 




This argument is reinforced by noting that most foreign bank entry into 
developing countries has been effected through the purchase of domestic 
institutions and not through start-up. In turn this implies that valuable 
market information has been lost. Typically the domestic institution would 
have been quoted on the local stock market and would have other fixed 
liabilities outstanding such as bonds. Foreign purchase is typically 
associated with stock market de-listing and, depending on the bank and its 
own internal organization and funding strategy, local debt instruments may 
also cease to be issued or issued in much smaller quantities. This implies 
that the market prices of equity and debt are replaced by implicit 
guarantees from the parent (in the case that such guarantees are presumed 
to exist).   
 
This reasoning begs the question of whether applying Pillar 3 to the 
subsidiary in each host country, whether material to the group or not, goes 
far enough. Indeed, a complementary strategy would be to ask the 
subsidiary to issue a certain quantity of subordinated debt locally. This 
would at least ensure that there was some market and hence price discovery 
on the risk of the subsidiary and hence some market assessment of the 
value of the parent’s (normally implicit) guarantee
29. 
 
                                                             
28 Of course the host supervisor knowing that the subsidiary is complying with home regulator IRB rules 
may insist on the Pillar 3 disclosures as a condition of operating within its jurisdiction but it would appear 
better, especially from the standpoint of regulatory cooperation, if this position was agreed between home 
and host – I am grateful to Eric Rosengren for pointing this out. 
29 See Calomiris and Powell (2002) for a review of Argentina’s experience implementing a “subordinated 
debt” regulation. 6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, the focus has been on two key issues regarding Basel II and 
Latin America.  First, taking into account the fact that capital regulations 
may not be binding, the conclusion is that Basel II may not have a major 
effect on the cost of capital for sovereigns in the region except for the 
countries with the lowest credit ratings. As discussed however this result 
should not be extrapolated to the private sector depending on how certain 
cross border issues are resolved.  The second conclusions is that the 
concern regarding pro-cyclicality may be exaggerated, as once again when 
a country’s rating declines banks will already behave pro-cyclically 
independently of the regulations in force. These results are however 
conditional on the use of default probabilities that are calibrated on 
corporate default histories and the lack of sovereign default history implies 
that some caution should be attached to these results. 
 
Second, the paper discussed the domestic implementation of Basel II in 
emerging countries.  Five country characteristics are introduced that may 
act as a guide to whether countries should implement Basel II and if so, 
how.  Moreover, it is argued that countries in Latin America may fall 
between two stools; the standardized approach will give little in terms of 
linking capital to risk whereas the IRB approach will be difficult to monitor 
given the state of supervision in the region.  Given this situation, a 
Centralized Rating Based (CRB) approach is suggested.  The idea is that 
banks rate borrowers according to a common or centralized rating scale.  
This would allow supervisors to monitor banks’ ratings and capital 
adequacy much more effectively and would build nicely on current policies 
in several countries, to monitor and enforce provisioning rules. The CRB 
approach may be a useful precursor to IRB for countries that wish to link 
banks’ reserving policies more closely to forward looking risk estimates 
but are some way away from IRB implementation. 
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